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Computational methods and network analysis are vital means for understanding how digital platforms are 
employed by political extremists. Western democracies focused on the security threat of jihadi extremism 
have been comparatively slow to recognise the threat of the far-right extremism (see Crosby 2021 and 
Rostami and Askanius 2021). Understandably, scholars have reacted to the knowledge gap about far-right 
extremists by practicing what we call “surveillance-as-method,” or the use of computational methods to 
gather data on far-right activities on digital media platforms, typically in order to track keywords or phrases 
or to map network connections. As we suggest here, the limits of surveillance-as-method include 
reproducing problems associated with state surveillance (van Dijck 2014) and underestimating the 
messiness (Pink, Lanzeni, and Horst 2018) of digital culture. Those limits need to be appreciated and 
approaches combined if we are to understand online politics. In this dialogue, we urge greater caution and 
reflexivity in reproducing surveillant methods, and greater attention to the historical, ideological context of 
far-right politics.  
This is for two key reasons. Firstly, surveillance-as-method reinforces an assumption that digital extremism 
needs only to be seen to be understood and addressed; that once it is revealed as extreme it will be seen for 
what it is and wither. Yet, many far-right extremists welcome academic exposure and critique because they 
can caricature and mock it as part of a wider ideological assault on universities, mainstream media, and 
liberalism. Beyond the risk of supplying far-right groups with “the oxygen of amplification” (Phillips 2018), 
academic surveillance risks supplying the far-right with what they want: evidence supporting their claim 
that the political mainstream is intolerant and exclusionary, in contrast to their pioneer-spirit of 
independence and freedom. This tactic is a novel “anticipatory data practice” (Kazansky 2021) that turns 
surveillance back on the surveillant, welcoming attention as evidence of politically motivated attack. 
This problem takes us to our second point: surveillance-as-method reinforces a tactic commonly used by 
right-wing extremists, who claim to be “keeping an eye on” liberals, the left, and their purported co-
conspirators in the mainstream media, exposing them as biased ideologues driven by an agenda. Here, 
surveillance becomes a central means of doing politics as a public revelation of “the truth about” politics 
and “what they don’t want you to know” (Finlayson 2020). Such revelation affirms and sustains common-
sense ideological divisions between good and bad, us and them. If scholars replicate this conflation of 
surveillance-as-method with surveillance-as-critique (assuming that, once unmasked as far-right politics, it 
has been shown to be an instance of what “everyone knows” is a bad thing), they risk perpetuating an 
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approach to politics that is constituted by, rather than derived from, the capacities and affordances of digital 
media. Chris Anderson (2008) somewhat notoriously argued in Wired that theories of human behaviour are 
obsolete; we don’t need to know why people do what they do when we can “track and measure it with 
unprecedented fidelity” and “with enough data, the numbers speak for themselves.” If we take this route, 
then politics will be nothing more or less than a conflict between “alternative facts,” competing practices of 
surveillance that reinforce the assumptions of their respective communities.  
We are not opposed to surveillance-as-method, but we argue that we also need strategies for moving beyond 
surveillance, integrating findings with theoretically and historically informed analysis of ideologies of the 
far right. 
Supplementing the State 
The global rise of a digitally powered far-right has been well-documented (Hawley 2017; Daniels 2018; 
Beran 2019; Fielitz and Thurston 2019). However, as Crosby (2021) shows in the case of Canada and 
Rostami and Askanius (2021) in that of Sweden, state actors have been slow to grapple with the threat of 
far-right extremism. The tracking and tracing of activity amongst these actors frequently falls to non-
governmental organisations and academics using what we describe here as surveillance-as-method, drawing 
on computational methods to scrape and collect large datasets of posts, comments, and profile markers on 
platforms ranging from Twitter to Telegram. These datasets are analysed, categorised, and quantified in 
ways intended to reveal its dangerously underappreciated volume and spread. Beyond the academy, activists 
and anti-fascist groups adopt similar methods as they monitor, record, and publicise the goals and desires 
of far-right communities in order to expose and incriminate participants. Surveillance and “capture” (Agre 
1994) are folded together. But it is not clear whether this necessary work is sufficient for political analysis 
and critique. 
Surveillance, Politics, Critique 
Although the alt-right and other far-right reactionary groups predate the 2016 US presidential election, the 
Trump campaign’s willingness to recirculate alt-right memes brought these digital political subcultures to 
mainstream attention. The most infamous portrayed Trump as “Pepe the Frog,” a formerly apolitical online 
comic character ironically repurposed by online communities into a far-right signifier. The Clinton 
campaign’s “Pepe the Frog explainer”—since scrubbed from the campaign website—accurately but too 
earnestly explained that Pepe was, in fact, a white nationalist symbol. The problem with these explainers 
wasn’t only that they supplied the “oxygen of amplification” to the alt-right. They also misunderstood the 
place of such digital political subcultures within a wider political ecology. They assumed that in “outing” 
digital extremism it would also be understood and addressed. The 4chan imageboard /pol/, on which Pepe 
was born as a right-wing meme, is perhaps obscure when seen by anyone more familiar with the user-
friendly interfaces of Facebook or Twitter. But political sentiments expressed on 4chan’s /pol/ board are not 
hidden. Racism, misogyny, and extremism are clearly and confidently expressed there. Pepe was not a covert 
symbol but a mascot, typically used to illustrate commentators’ alliance with the alt-right and intended to 
“trigger” audiences of earnest liberals. The Clinton campaign was right that Pepe is a meme favored among 
white nationalists but missed its part in a wider political culture of trolling. Making a heavily favored 
presidential candidate worry over a cartoon frog was a propaganda win for alt-right communities.  
Commentators have become alert to the weaponised irony of the alt-right and of the difficulties of 
ascertaining meaning on the “ambivalent internet” (Phillips and Milner 2017). This ambivalence 
problematises the quantification of right-wing subcultural tropes, memes, and in-group references. The tools 
of surveillance-as-method, including data-scraping, network-graphing, and keyword-tracking, are vital for 
identifying far-right activity online and raising awareness. But revealing their symbols, memes, and in-
group references is not enough. In the “mask culture” (de Zeeuw and Tuters 2020: 215) of 4chan, anonymity 
and irony dominate, making it impossible to connect posts to an author or to assign a meaning to the content 
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of any post. But anonymity and ambivalence are not the same as obscurity. Simple exposure cannot unmask 
the sources of content born from a medium and a culture as much as from individual authors. Digital content 
circulates as untethered shares, replies, and remixes. Surveillance-as-method cannot help us make sense of 
subcultural spaces that are openly and ironically extremist. Indeed, such irony and anonymity are forms of 
“vernacular resistance” (Brunton and Nissenbaum 2011) to the “dataveillance” (van Dijck 2014: 198) built 
into digital environments. Surveillance-as-method can show whether extremist content exists but not what 
the context of that content is, nor the new ways in which it enacts politics.  
In addition to the tracing and tracking of surveillance-as-method, we propose attending to the digital forms 
that structure and give rise to extremist propaganda online. Digital data is “a complex epistemic object” 
(Aradau and Blanke 2015: 4) that is not given but is always “in-formation” (Reigeluth 2014: 252). Consider, 
for example, the alt-right and the gamified conspiracy theory QAnon. At one level, these are nothing alike. 
Where the alt-right is self-consciously edgy and ironic, QAnon followers tend to be earnest and sincere. 
Where the alt-right skews young and male (Hawley 2017), QAnon is popular among women and mothers 
(Bloom and Moskalenko 2021). Yet both share origins in the obscurantist style of 4chan. Both coordinate 
an in-group through a referential repertoire significant only to the initiated, from “pede”1 to “cuck”2 to 
“breadcrumbs”3 and “baking.”4 Both found a hero in Trump. Both have a clear—and often shared—set of 
enemies among the liberal elite. Both gain momentum from mainstream critiques and attempts to track and 
trace their every move. And, it is worth emphasizing, both operate in the open. Their references may be for 
the already-initiated, but they are not secrets. Both groups actively propagandise. And, as we are arguing 
here, both feed on mainstream criticism, which only provides proof of their enemies and new content to 
caricature.  
What this suggests is that the form of such groups may be as significant as their content (see Topinka, 
forthcoming). The sociologist Georg Simmel (1909: 302) uses the term “forms of association” to describe 
the material formal structures through which “human beings arrange themselves in association.” For 
extreme groups such as the alt-right and QAnon, these “forms of association” are linked with what media 
scholars call “affordances,” the properties of websites, platforms, interfaces, and other digital media that 
make certain kinds of action possible (and others harder or impossible). We suggest that scholarly attention 
to extreme politics online ought to focus more on this overall form, the ecology, of which they are a singular 
manifestation. Such analysis of the “form” of communicative intervention necessitates qualitative 
interpretation informed by a theoretical understanding of how ideologies—and those of the right and far-
right in particular—work so that we can make sense of how the standard argumentational patterns of such 
ideologies interact with the digital system.  
Consider, for instance, the idea of the “echo chamber”—that digital media intensify partisan belonging 
because people are exposed only to material from within their ideological universe. The reality is somewhat 
different. Partisan online sites draw on, repost, and address material from outside their “echo chamber.” But 
they treat it as primary evidence of the lies, deceptions, and conspiracies against which participants are 
organised. They compete to find examples and to demonstrate their capacity at interpreting and explaining 
what it “really” means. In this way, they are themselves engaging in a conflation of surveillance-as-method 
with surveillance-as-critique. They are ideal participants within digital technoculture, whom Jodi Dean 
(2001: 625) describes as “searching, suspicious subjects ever clicking for more information, ever drawn to 
uncover the secret and find out for themselves.” Paradoxically, this is a politics that is both extremist and 
entirely normal for this culture, these platforms, and their affordances: we surveil the other side, bringing 
our findings back to our own side where we measure how far beyond the pale they are. To understand a 
                                                   
1 As in “centipede”—the moniker adopted by Trump fans on Reddit, indicating their “nimble navigation” of online 
news and information in curating pro-Trump discourse. 
2 Shortened from cuckold as a pejorative directed at liberals and Trump opponents. 
3 Referring to the obscure hints at a liberal conspiracy offered by “Q,” the alleged Washington insider posting on 
4chan and later 8kun. 
4 The term QAnon followers use to describe their work interpreting the “breadcrumbs” or obscure hints. 
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politics today, as well as mapping, measuring, and interpreting its utterances, we must locate it in relation 
to the digital culture of which it is a part and explain how the ideological propositions making up its content 
are made possible, modified, and circulated by the form to which they belong. 
Conclusion  
Online, political activists surveil each other. They monitor each other’s traffic, establish each other’s 
identity, and expose the “agenda” to which each is working. In noting this, we do not for a moment intend 
to suggest that the two sides are the same, or that, as Trump might put it, there are bad people on both sides. 
Our point is that this situation is one part of a radically transformed environment within which political 
ideas are formed, articulated, and circulated. If we do not understand that, we do not understand what is 
happening.  
As noted above, there has been a tendency on the part of security forces to underplay the extent of 
ideologically organised and motivated domestic terrorism in contrast to Islamist political violence. As 
Ganesh (2021) shows, while Jihadi propaganda is banned and deplatformed the rhetoric of the far right 
remains online, their presence justified in the language of “free speech protection.” This is indicative of the 
fact that what they say is precisely not beyond the pale or guaranteed to be seen as unacceptable once 
exposed for what it is. On the contrary, theirs is a rhetoric that overlaps with, draws from, and feeds into a 
wider ecosystem. In this context, analysis cannot only count and describe what is there, and it can’t simply 
securitise what it finds. It must put things properly in their place.  
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